Vladimir Putin has given no indication that he is interested in reaching a durable settlement to end the Russia-Ukraine War.

By Paul J. Saunders

A US-Russia summit reportedly set for August 15 in Alaska has captivated Washington and European capitals. Commentators are decrying the guest list (shouldn’t Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky join?) and warning about President Donald Trump’s possible concessions to his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin. The hand-wringing misses the point. The central challenge to any ceasefire or peace deal is not who sits at the table or what Trump might offer. It is the absence of convincing evidence that Putin himself wants an agreement to end his war in Ukraine.

Putin Thinks He Can Win on the Battlefield

Negotiations can work only if both parties prefer a settlement to the status quo and other manageable alternatives. To date, Russia’s president appears to believe that he is winning and likely sees no compelling reason to relinquish now what he expects to take later. Likewise, notwithstanding regular suggestions that Russia’s economy is struggling under US and Western sanctions, there is little evidence that Russia’s leader feels pressure to make significant concessions as a result. Nor are growing casualties producing domestic pressure. So far, Putin has successfully managed this domestic political problem by insisting that his invasion was necessary for Russia’s security rather than optional. 

Zelensky Worries He Might Lose at the Negotiating Table

Whether or not he travels to Alaska to meet Trump or Trump and Putin, something that looks improbable if not impossible, President Zelensky probably fears pressure to make concessions that he might not have to if his country gets a little more outside help. And since he can more-or-less count on Putin to refuse a meeting with him, a pressure campaign on Trump to include him costs little and reminds all that Kyiv’s acquiescence will eventually be necessary. And that even under pressure, there are limits to what Ukraine’s government and public would accept.

Raising this question also allows Zelensky and his government to marshal European support for Ukraine and to add that leverage to his own limited ability to influence the White House. This has already secured a meeting with​​ Zelensky and German chancellor, Friedrich Merz, in Berlin, as well as a virtual meeting with Trump, Vice President JD Vance, and several European leaders.

Why Putin Thinks He Will Win

How could Putin be so confident when Russia’s battlefield progress remains slow? The answer is two-fold. First, Russian observers view a war of attrition that Ukraine will struggle to win, given Russia’s greater population and resources. Moscow’s externally facing media routinely present this view. Second, and more importantly, Russia’s strategy does not require conquering Ukrainian territory to produce the Kremlin’s preferred political outcomes. On the contrary, in a manner reminiscent of Carl von Clausewitz, it assumes that military victory will follow from failures of will in Kyiv, Washington, and key European capitals.

How Putin Evolved from a Pragmatist to an Ideologue

This is not the only obstacle, however. Another challenge is that Putin was once more pragmatic than he appears to be today. From his first months in power through approximately 2010–2012, he recognized the potential benefits of working with the United States and pursued a more cooperative relationship. He was famously the first foreign leader to call then-President George W. Bush after the 9/11 attacks, offered sympathy and support to the United States, and tolerated US bases in Central Asia (for a time). None of this meant that he sought friendship; rather, he was willing to compartmentalize disagreements to pursue Russia’s interests.

Over the last decade, particularly after his return to the presidency in 2012, Putin’s posture hardened. Putin’s rhetoric and actions have grown more ideological and zero-sum: the annexation of Crimea, intervention in Syria, expanded repression at home, and a civilizational narrative depicting the West as decadent and hostile. In recent addresses and proposals, he has defined maximalist goals. When a leader defines success in civilizational and moral terms, compromise becomes politically and personally costly. And even Vladimir Putin contends with domestic politics.

Putin Likely Thinks That Working with America Is Impossible

Putin now probably believes that he has tried to work with four or five American presidents and that he has learned that American elites oppose what he has sought in the US-Russia relationship. Thus, even if Trump personally favors improved relations, Kremlin strategists expect opposition in Congress, the media, and within the Trump administration itself to block a new “reset” with the United States, much as they believe occurred during Trump’s first administration, because “Russophobes” dominate US policy debates.

Russia’s government is similarly aware of the looming US midterm elections in 2026, which could produce new investigations or more. Similarly, the 2028 presidential election might turn the White House over to a Democratic leader. Since Putin believes the American “system” will work to block a rapprochement, if not now, then following the next election, he has little incentive to trade hard-won battlefield gains to Trump for promises he expects others to contest and reverse. 

Notice That Putin Is Not Asking for a US-Russia Treaty

Moscow has traditionally preferred binding, ratified treaties with the United States. The logic is simple: Senate advice and consent create durability across administrations. When Russia accepted non-treaty alternatives, the results reinforced its skepticism. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran—implemented as an executive agreement—is a case in point; Trump himself exited the arrangement in 2018.

The fact that Russian officials are now comfortable with a United Nations Security Council resolution codifying a Ukraine deal, the exact mechanism used in the JCPOA, suggests that they are less concerned about a Senate-ratified US commitment than in past disputes that were less important to Moscow.

Why? Two explanations are possible. One is that Russia wants a quick deal. The other—more plausible—is that the Kremlin isn’t serious about a sustainable settlement that extends beyond 2026 or 2028. If Putin sought a durable accord, he would want it locked in by a Senate-ratified treaty, as Russia has in many other cases. His failure to press publicly for that outcome implies that he does not expect to reach a durable agreement in the first place. This does not, however, rule out knowingly reaching an unsustainable ceasefire.

The Bottom Line

Debates over who attends a summit and hypothetical concessions there distract from a more basic reality: negotiations succeed when both sides want an agreement more than their alternatives. So far, the Kremlin’s words and actions indicate that Putin prefers his current course and believes he will succeed. Until credible evidence shows otherwise, US policymakers should treat this meeting as a test of intent—as President Trump now claims—not as an opportunity for a quick peace.

Paul J. Saunders is President of the Center for the National Interest and a member of its board of directors. His expertise spans US foreign and security policy, energy security and climate change, US-Russia relations and Russian foreign policy, and US relations with Japan and South Korea. Saunders is a Senior Advisor at the Energy Innovation Reform Project, where he served as president from 2019 to 2024. He has been a member of EIRP’s board of directors since 2013 and served as chairman from 2014 to 2019.       

© Copyright 2025 Center for the National Interest