The end of the Russo-Ukrainian War draws near. While halting the terrible violence is a net positive, there are legitimate fears of Russian manipulation to create peace terms suitable for Putin.

By:  Maria Popova, and Oxana Shevel

President Trump’s confidence that he can negotiate a lasting peace in the Russo-Ukrainian war should not blind us to the fact that there is no evidence that Putin’s Russia is ready, willing, or interested in compromise. Its goals remain much more far-reaching than keeping Ukraine out of NATO or retaining control of the Ukrainian territory Russia seized by force. No invasion was necessary to keep Ukraine out of NATO either in 2014 or in 2022 given that NATO accession was never realistic. 

Russia went to war to prevent Ukraine from asserting its sovereignty, whether externally by moving towards the EU geopolitically, or internally by consolidating democracy in sharp contrast to Russia’s repressive autocracy. All of Russia’s actions since 2014 show that as long as Ukraine remains free and westward looking, Russia’s goals remain unsatisfied and the “root causes” of the war, as Putin sees them, are unresolved. War, as Putin sees it, remains unresolved. Thus, despite the warm tone between the U.S. and Russia at the talks in Riyadh, the conflict is intractable. 

Given the incompatibility of Russia’s goal to vassalize Ukraine and Ukrainians’ determination to live in a sovereign state of their own, one should not delude themselves into thinking that the upcoming negotiations will be discussions in good faith that aim to find an elusive solution acceptable to all. 

Instead, the talks represent merely a shift of strategy for Putin with his decades-old aim of subjugating Ukraine looming as large as ever. Ukraine’s determined resistance, supported by the West, denied Russia its goal to take over the Ukrainian state by force. 

By claiming that he’s ready to negotiate, Putin is switching from military conquest back to his 2014-2021 political strategy of seeking to take away Ukraine’s sovereignty through a pretend “peace process.”

Bygone Treaties And Promises

Between 2014 and 2022 Russia tried to use the Minsk Peace Process to secure a de-facto veto over the decision-making power of the government in Kyiv through getting Russia’s Donbas proxies a constitutionally-enshrined “special status.” 

When it became clear that Kyiv would not open its gates to the Minsk Trojan horse, Russia launched the full-scale invasion and immediately pushed for Kyiv to decapitate the Zelensky government. In the Istanbul negotiations in the spring of 2022, Russia insisted on Ukrainian demilitarization and demanded a veto over security assistance to Ukraine in case of a renewed attack. 

Ukraine accepting these demands would have guaranteed that it wouldn’t be able to defend itself from a future invasion. Moreover, Russia, putting forth these demands first, signaled its intent to pursue such an invasion as soon as it recovered its military capacity. In other words, the Istanbul “deal” would have amounted to Russia achieving its goal of Ukrainian capitulation. 

Finally, Russia’s current emphatic rejection of the idea that Ukrainian and Russian territories should be exchanged, Kursk for Donbas for example, further indicates that Russia doesn’t care about any of the contested territories, it continues to be single-mindedly focused on imposing control over Ukraine’s central government. 

By hook or by crook, Russia has been trying to turn Ukraine into a vassal, devoid of any meaningful external as well as internal sovereignty. It hasdemanded control over Ukraine’s identity, language, and historical memory policies, policy areas distant and disconnected from hard security or military matters. 

“Ukraine has always been a leader in peacemaking efforts; if Russia wants to end this war, let it prove it with actions,” President Zelensky, G20 Summit, 2022

The Erasure Of A Nation

In occupied Ukraine, Russia has been eradicating all traces of Ukrainian identity, undertaking massive brainwashing of Ukrainian children through the education system, militarized state-run organizations, and persecuting those who dare speak Ukrainian. 

From Putin down, Russia’s leadership continues to claim that Ukraine’s very existence is an abomination, that Ukrainians are Russians, and that Ukraine’s territory must be divided. This naked imperialism is not a fringe view but is touted by Putin and his senior officials. 

If Russia doesn’t want to compromise and accept terms that would guarantee Ukraine’s sovereignty and freedom from Russian diktat, then what is the future of peace talks? 

Potential Peace SNAFUs

There is a real danger of the U.S. falling for Russia’s lie that it seeks peace, something Trump already said he believes, and getting rug-pulled by Russia’s pseudo-solutions. The outcome may mimic a solution, but in reality, it would set the stage for Ukraine’s destabilization and vassalization. 

So then what are the main elements to watch out for to avoid this scenario? 

Firstly, limitations on Ukrainian armed forces, the amount of military aid Ukraine can receive from allies, and no or very small external peacekeeping force may be on the chopping block. Any one of these limits would increase the likelihood of a renewed Russian attack. 

U.S. Defense Secretary Peter Hegseth already stated that the potential peacekeeping force in Ukraine would include neither U.S. military personnel nor be covered by NATO Article 5. This signals to Russia that such a force is unlikely to present a major obstacle to a renewed attack. Once the negotiations formally commence, Russia will likely oppose any external military presence in Ukraine and may try to leverage other concessions for its willingness to “compromise” on some very minor force of no consequence. 

President Zelensky said that Ukraine’s armed forces need to be 1.5 million strong and fully equipped, and the size of the foreign contingent would need to be at least 100,000. In Istanbul, Russia demanded a ceiling of just 100,000 on the Ukrainian army, plus significant limitations on the quantity and type of weapons. 

On this critical issue, a midway solution will be insufficient to guarantee Ukraine’s security and will set the stage for a third Russian invasion. 

Another component Russia may try to see enacted in a negotiation would be forcing Ukraine to hold presidential elections on a timeline favored by Russia: elections immediately after a cease-fire and before a comprehensive settlement. 

By insisting on immediate elections, Putin is playing on the West’s democratic sensitivities to destabilize and divide Ukraine and give Russia a window of opportunity to achieve its goal of subjugating Ukraine. To hold elections, Ukraine would need to lift martial law, which would result in demobilization. 

The second risk of holding elections in the environment of a temporary ceasefire and uncertainty about the final settlement is that Russia would use all the disinformation and election interference tools at its disposal to bring about a Georgia scenario where a pro-Russian “peace candidate”comes to power by successfully playing on the exhaustion and fears of a war-traumatized society. 

Once in power, such a candidate would be more likely to make bigger concessions to Russia in the final settlement. To avoid this risk, Ukraine’s allies need to emphatically reject Putin’s illegitimacy claim about Zelensky and emphasize that it is baffling for a dictator to speak about democratic legitimacy. 

Ukrainian elections should be held only after a comprehensive settlement has put in place practical measures that ensure Ukraine’s long-term security.   

By mentioning the withdrawal of American troops stationed in Europe as part of an agreement with Russia, U.S. Secretary of Defense Hegseth may have inadvertently revealed evidence that Russia’s ambitions extend well beyond Ukraine into Europe. 

Europe is likely to balk at such a disadvantageous agreement. If Zelensky refuses to sign on the dotted line, like he already did in Munich when the U.S. offered a disadvantageous natural resources agreement, Trump may be forced to admit that he has no speedy deal.  

Maria Popova is Associate Professor of Political Science at McGill University and Director of the Jean Monnet Centre Montreal.

Oxana Shevel is an Associate Professor of political science and Director of the International Relations program at Tufts University.        

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